Equity investment in collateralized debt obligations ( s) is an enormously complex endeavor. As primary bearers of the risks associated with  collateral, persons contemplating investments in  equity must weigh myriad factors, both qualitative and quantitative, that may potentially affect their returns. Chief among these are a variety of non-tax considerations involving, among others, the evaluation of the capabilities of the  manager and the assessment of possible returns under different cash flow scenarios. Crucial as these considerations may be, savvy investors also must engage in sophisticated tax planning to maximize the after-tax returns on their investments.
 equity must weigh myriad factors, both qualitative and quantitative, that may potentially affect their returns. Chief among these are a variety of non-tax considerations involving, among others, the evaluation of the capabilities of the  manager and the assessment of possible returns under different cash flow scenarios. Crucial as these considerations may be, savvy investors also must engage in sophisticated tax planning to maximize the after-tax returns on their investments.
Depending on the circumstances, .. equity investments in s may be governed by the Passive Foreign Investment Company ( ) rules, the Controlled Foreign Company ( ) rules, or both. 1 The  and  tax regimes are exceptionally nuanced and, consequently, proper tax planning depends on a careful analysis of the individual circumstances of the investor and its analysis of the risks of the investment.
This article focuses on tax aspects of equity investments in s by taxable .. persons and the strategies that may effectively be used to maximize certain .. tax benefits. The discussion focuses on the characteristics of a typical offshore  structure, on advantages that .. investors in  equity may obtain by making a Qualified Electing Fund election (  election), the circumstances in which a  election is not advisable, and the interplay of the  rules. The goal is to reduce as much as possible the tax owed with respect to amounts flowing into and out of the . To achieve this end, the  itself must not be subject to entity-level tax in the location where it is organized. This means that there should be neither tax on income received by the  nor any withholding tax liability on interest or dividends from investments in the . 
ii) Choice of Entity for the SPV
The  typically is organized as an entity that is treated as a corporation under default .. tax rules, or a "check-the-box" election is made to achieve this end. This is done primarily for the benefit of taxexempt .. investors, which are taxed on income from their leveraged investments. 3 For .. federal tax purposes, a corporation is a separate legal entity and, even when it borrows to finance investments, distributions to its tax-exempt shareholders are not considered leveraged and consequently are not taxed.
iii) Balance Sheet CDOs, Market Arbitrage CDOs and the Collateral Manager
Traditionally, s have appeared in two flavors: balance sheet s and market arbitrage s.
The two differ primarily in the way the assets backing the  structure (the "collateral pool") are assembled. Balance sheet s are initiated by holders of securitizable assets, usually banks or other large financial institutions, to remove certain assets from their balance sheets in order to meet capital or regulatory requirements. In these types of deals, the originator in effect sells its own assets to the , which finances such purchases by issuing notes and selling preferred shares to investors.
Arbitrage s involve the participation of a collateral manager in the  structure. The primary role of the collateral manager is to acquire assets for the collateral pool and to manage them for the duration of the . Prior to the initiation of a typical arbitrage  structure, the collateral manager identifies and acquires various assets in the marketplace, placing them on its own books. At the closing of the deal, the collateral manager sells these assets to the  for cash, which is raised by the  through the issuance of notes collateralized by the collateral pool and the sale of preferred equity in the .
iv) CDO Assets
Any asset with predictable cash flows can be included in a  structure. The types of assets historically backing s include, among others, bank loans, emerging-market debt, middle-market loans, project finance debt, real estate investment trust ( ) debt, high-yield bonds, and trust preferred securities.
v) The CDO Waterfall
Generally, the liability structure in a typical  consists of three tranches of debt and equity. At the very top of the chain is the senior tranche of debt (Class A), ordinarily rated " "/"Aaa," followed by the mezzanine tranche (Class ), rated " "/"Bbb," and preferred equity, which is unrated. As the collateral pool generates cash flows, the moneys are distributed in order of priority to the debt tranches and then, if anything is left over, to the  equity-holders. Thus, the  provisions would apply even if a .. investor owned a relatively small percentage of  equity. As will be discussed further, however, the  rules do not apply to ..
investors that are subject to the  rules of Subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code").
A  will be a  if more than % of either the total combined voting power or the total combined value of all outstanding stock is owned directly, indirectly, or constructively by .. shareholders on any day during the 's tax year. For purposes of the  rules, a ". . shareholder" is any .. person (. . citizen, resident alien, corporation, partnership, trust, or estate) owning % or more of the foreign corporation's total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote.
As discussed above, a  may meet the definitions of both a  and a  if, for example, it satisfies either the  income or asset tests and the stock ownership rules of the  regime. .. investors in s, however, will be exempt from the  rules for any portion of their stockholding period (the "qualified portion") during which the  is a  with respect to such investors. 6 In other words, if a .. investor in a  owns % or more of  stock entitled to vote, the  rules will not apply, and such income from the  to such investor will, under the  rules discussed below, be subject to current inclusion in gross income of the investor.
ii) Tax Consequences of PFIC Status
The purpose of the  regime is to prevent deferral of income earned by .. investors from investments in foreign corporations whose income or assets consist predominantly of passive items. In the case of  shareholders that do not elect Qualified Electing Fund ( ) status, discussed in greater detail below, this is accomplished by requiring .. investors owning  shares, including equity in s that are s, to pay a .. tax plus interest on amounts constituting what are termed "excess distributions."
Under the  regime, an "excess distribution" is the amount by which distributions received in respect of  shares in a given taxable year exceed % of the average amount received in respect of such stock during the preceding three taxable years. Gain recognized on the sale of  stock is also an "excess distribution" for purposes of the  rules. Thus, any gain recognized in a given taxable year on the sale of equity in s that are s, plus any excess distributions with respect to such equity for that taxable year, will constitute "excess distributions" subject to the onerous .. taxation and interest charges of the  regime.
To calculate the tax that may be due under the  regime, excess distributions are allocated pro rata over the period the shareholder has held its  stock. 7 Any portion of excess distributions that is allocated to pre-  years of the , or to the current taxable year of the  shareholder, is included in the income of the  shareholder for the current taxable year as ordinary income. Any portion of excess distributions that is allocated to prior  taxable years is taxed at the highest rate of .. tax then in effect for the  shareholder ("deferred tax"). In addition,  shareholders must pay interest on the amounts of deferred tax. The interest charge on the deferred tax is computed using the method and rates applicable to underpayments under section  of the Code.
Assume, for example, that a .. investor owns equity in a  on each day of Years , , and . Further assume that this  is a  with respect to the .. investor, and that in Year  the .. investor receives a single $ distribution with respect to its  equity. For the sake of simplicity, also assume that the highest rate of tax applicable with respect to the .. investor for Years ,  and  is %, and that the interest rate on underpayments is % compounded annually.
If the .. investor does not elect  treatment in Year , all of the $ received in Year  will constitute an "excess distribution" for purposes of the  rules, because distributions for both Years  and  are zero. The excess distribution of $ will be allocated ratably over the .. investor's three-year holding period, $ to each of Years , , and . As a result, $ of the excess distribution allocated to Year  will be included as ordinary income in the ..
investor's Year  gross income, resulting in a tax of $. The $ allocated between Years  and , on the other hand, will be subject to the deferred tax plus interest, resulting in total liability for tax and interest of $. for Year  and $. for Year . Thus, at the end of Year , the .. investor will owe $. in tax and interest, or .% of the total return from its investment.
iii) Taxation of U.S. Shareholders under the CFC Rules:
If the  is a  in addition to being a  in a given year, .. investors that own at least % of the voting power of the  equity will be ". . shareholders" for purposes of the  rules. If a .. equity-holder in a  is a .. shareholder, it cannot elect  status (discussed below) and is, instead, subject to the  tax regime. Generally, the  rules require .. shareholders in a  to include as ordinary income for a taxable year their pro rata share of the 's "subpart  income" 8 and their pro rata share of the 's earnings from assets invested in ..
property.
iv) Qualified Electing Funds:
To avoid the default tax regime under the  rules, many investors in  equity elect In this scenario, the ..  equity-holder will be responsible for $. of tax in Years , , and  (assuming a tax rate of %), on the earnings and profits, and $ of tax for each of those years on the long-term capital gain (assuming a tax rate of %). Accordingly, ignoring the time value of money, the total tax liability for the .. investor in this scenario will be $., or $. less than in Example .
These tax savings are due entirely to the ..
investor's ability to take advantage of lower tax rates for long-term capital gains under the  rules and the absence of interest charges on deferred tax amounts.
The third, but very important, reason why .. equity investors tend to elect  treatment is the economic distortion caused by the default  rule's requirement that excess distributions be allocated pro rata over the shareholder's entire stockholding period. Under ordinary circumstances, the equity-holder's share of the earnings and profits of the  will increase over time as the  structure matures. Accordingly, if a  election is in place, the increase in the equity-holder's tax liability will be proportionate to the increase in its pro rata share of  earnings and profits. However, in the absence of a  election, portions of larger distributions in later years of the  structure will constitute excess distributions and will be re-allocated over the shareholder's entire holding period. Consequently, the equity-holder's income is effectively shifted to earlier tax years, which results in higher interest charges than would be due if the  election and the tax deferral were in place.
Example : Assume that the facts are the same as in Example , except that the .. equityholder's pro rata share of the 's earnings and profits for Years , , and , is $, $, and $, respectively. Also assume that the  structure generates no long-term capital gains and that the equity-holder receives a single lump-sum payment of $ at the end of the 's term in Year .
Under the default rule, the entire lump sum payment received by the .. equity-holder in Year  will be an excess distribution that, as in Example , results in total liability for tax and interest of $.. However, if the .. equity-investor elects  treatment in Year  and chooses to defer tax in each of the three years of the  structure, it would only owe $. in tax and interest. Thus, the pro rata reallocation of income to prior years under the default rules would result in the ..  equity-holder in this example owing $. more in nondeductible interest payments.
.     :
Although .. equity investors in s commonly elect  treatment, there are two distinct situations in which .. equity investors should exercise extreme caution prior to electing  status: if the  has "excessive turbo" or the  may turn into a "bombed out" deal.
Turbo occurs in a deal when interest on collateral is used to pay principal on the issuer's securities. In a bombed out , returns generated by the collateral pool are expected to be impaired significantly by future defaults. In the former situation, .. equity investors may want to elect  treatment in conjunction with a deferral of tax. In the latter situation, .. equity investors may want to avoid making the election altogether. In addition, there are also situations in which a  election is not possible. Each of these is discussed below.
i) The QEF Election in Deals with Excessive Turbo
Deals with excessive turbo typically require the interest and/or principal of  debt to be repaid before any amounts are distributed to  equityholders. Under the  rules, .. equityholders in such s are required to include in current income, and pay tax on, their pro rata share of the 's earnings and profits, including those earnings and profits used to pay principal on  debt (interest payments are deductible by the ). These current inclusions in income may create a problem, however, in the event that current distributions to equity-holders are insufficient to satisfy their current tax liabilities arising from such inclusions. In such event, the .. equity-holder electing  treatment may be forced to satisfy such tax liabilities out of its own funds.
Fortunately, .. equity-holders can circumvent the problem described above by electing to defer tax under the  rules. By deferring tax under the  rules, the ..  equity-holder is able to delay paying tax on current inclusions of earnings and profits until the  makes sufficient distributions to satisfy these tax liabilities. The ..  equity-holder is also able to preserve the long-term capital gain character of its ratable share of  income and, more importantly, avoid the distorting effect of the default rules. The amounts of deferred tax, however, are subject to a relatively high rate of interest.
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Example :
Assume a  deal is funded entirely by borrowing, the amount of borrowed capital is $,, the interest rate on  debt is %, and the collateral pool generates a % return. Further assume that this is a prototypical "excess turbo" deal requiring interest and principal of  debt to be repaid over a -year period before any distributions are made to the equityholder. Accordingly, if the .. equityholder elects  treatment, it will pay tax each year on the principal payments to  debt-holders (the interest payments to debtholders are deductible). In the first year of the structure, the interest payment on  debt will be $, and the principal payment will be $. Assuming the applicable .. tax rate is %, the equity-holder will have a .. tax liability of $ in the first year of the deal, but does not receive any distributions from the  because all cash flows are used to pay principal and interest on  debt. Accordingly, in this hypothetical, the ..
equity-holder may want to defer tax under the  rules until it receives sufficient distributions of cash to satisfy its tax liabilities.
In this hypothetical, electing  treatment and deferring tax may be more advantageous than not making the election, despite an interest charge on deferred tax under the  rules, because the .. equity-holder is able to recognize his share of  capital gain and avoid the pro rata reallocation of his income to prior years.
ii) Situations Where the QEF Election is Disadvantageous
The  election should be avoided in "bombed out" deals because, in certain situations, it may lead to a whipsaw. For example, the  regime requires the  equity-holder to pay tax on a current basis on its pro rata share of the 's earnings and profits, even if distributions are deferred until sometime in the future. Unfortunately, if the deal sours, the equity-holder nonetheless will be responsible for taxes on current inclusions of earnings and profits, even though it may never receive subsequent matching distributions. To make matters worse, if the ..
equity-holder suffers a loss because its current inclusions under the  regime are greater than the total distributions with respect to its  equity, it would be able to recognize only a capital loss on any future disposition of its stock.
iii) Situations Where the QEF Election is Impossible
Many European s hesitate to comply with  rules because doing so would require them to give their equity-holders access to their books and records. Consequently, it is common for European s not to provide their .. investors with the requisite information for a  election. The failure to comply with the information disclosure requirements of the  rules frequently bars .. equity-holders in European s from making the highly advantageous  election. This situation can also arise in s that invest in equity of other s.
Assume the facts are as follows: the  deal is funded entirely by  debt of $, with an interest rate of %, the collateral pool generates a % return, and the deal is expected to last  years. To simplify matters, assume that in this , the debt-holders receive no payments of principal during the term of the deal, and that the entire principal balance of the  debt is expected to be paid off by selling  collateral at the end of the -year term. Further, assume that the excess interest generated by  collateral is kept in a reserve to ensure repayment of principal on  debt. In this situation, if the .. equity-holder elects  treatment in Year , it will recognize $ of income over  years, receiving a basis step-up of $, and paying a total of $ in tax (assuming a % tax rate). However, if at the end of the -year term the entire reserve is used to satisfy principal obligations on  debt because of defaults in the collateral pool, the  equity-holder will receive no payments with respect to its  equity stake. Thus, as a result of the current inclusions under the  rules, the ..  equity-holder in this example is effectively whipsawed. It pays tax at ordinary income rates on $ of phantom income over the term of the , but, at a subsequent disposition of its worthless  equity, it recognizes a capital loss of $ that may be unusable.
.   :
i) The Mark-to-Market Election .. owners of  equity that is "marketable stock" 13 for purposes of section  of the Code generally should make a "mark-to-market election."
The mark-to-market election permits ..
investors to pay tax on the annual appreciation in the value of their stock in lieu of the default  tax regime and the current inclusion of earnings and profits of the  election.
14 Thus, with the mark-to-market election,  equity-holders pay tax only in the event that the value of their shares appreciates. Moreover, the mark-to-market election permits electing shareholders to deduct annual declines in the value of their stock.
ii) Waiting a Year to Elect QEF Status:
Equity investors in s should consider waiting until the year following their acquisition of  stock to elect  treatment. By doing so, they in effect have two years to assess the 's performance and to ensure that the  election is truly to their advantage. 15 Additionally, even if there are distributions with respect to  equity in the first year of the structure, these will not be subject to the default  tax rules, because a shareholder cannot have an "excess distribution" in the year that it acquires  stock.
. 
This article has highlighted for .. investments by a tax-exempt entity is not subject to tax. However, where the tax-exempt entity borrows to finance its investments, income from such investments is deemed to be Unrelated Business Taxable Income (UBTI) and is subject to tax. This is also the case where the tax-exempt entity invests in a flow-through entity, such as a partnership or an LLC, which leverages its investments. It is not the case when the tax-exempt entity invests non-borrowed funds in a corporation. 4. Differing rates of return on various tranches of CDO debt and equity may also result from the yield curve not being flat. 5. For purposes of the income and asset tests, "passive income" includes dividends, interest, royalties, rents, annuities, and income from swaps and certain property and currency transactions. 6. For purposes of PFIC rules, when a shareholder in a CFC which is also a PFIC ceases to be a "U.S. shareholder," the shareholder will receive a new holding period for his PFIC stock which begins on the day following the loss of "U.S. shareholder" status. However, the former U.S. shareholder will not get a new holding period if his shares were stock of a PFIC at any time prior to the qualified portion of the shareholder's holding period, and the shareholder did not make a gain recognition election pursuant to section 1298(b)(1) at the time he ceased to be a U.S. shareholder. 7. The holding period for PFIC stock includes the period up to the date of the distribution. Moreover, the holding period is calculated separately for batches of stock acquired on different dates. 8. For purposes of our discussion, Subpart F income includes passive investment income of the type generated by CDOs.
